In general, we agree with Pothos's claim that similarity and rule knowledge are best viewed as situated on the extreme points of a single representational continuum. However, we contend that a distinction can be made between "rulelike" and "rule-based" knowledge: Rule-based, symbolic knowledge is necessarily conscious when it is applied. Awareness thus provides a useful criterion for distinguishing between sensitivity to functional similarity and knowledge of symbolic rules.
In his treatment of the rule vs. similarity distinction, Pothos argues that rules and overall similarity are best viewed as the extreme points of a continuum involving only processes of similarity. We very much agree with this position, having previously defended similar views (Cleeremans, 1997) . The point is made particularly salient by the performance of certain connectionist networks. Under some circumstances, such networks develop internal representations that are structured in a manner that is clearly reflective of abstract properties of the stimulus material -the nodes of a finite-state grammar that the network has only seen exemplars of (Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991) ; relational features that depend not on the surface similarity but on the functional similarity between different exemplars of the domain (Hinton, 1986 ). Yet under other circumstances, the very same networks may end up developing internal representations that are much more closely tied to specific properties of the exemplars the network has been trained on.
Clearly then, (1) abstract representations and exemplar-based representations can both occur in the very same representational medium, and (2) when abstract representations are achieved, they can function just as though an actual symbolic rule had been learned: Such networks can thus behave as though they followed a rule, but without actually having learned anything that one could characterize as a symbolic, propositional, "IF … THEN" rule.
Both points are congruent with Pothos's proposal, and the second -achieving rule-like behavior without using actual rules -is in our view the strongest illustration of the power of simple associative learning mechanisms. However, as Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) pointed out, there is a crucial difference between a network that exhibits rule-like behavior and an agent that actually possesses rule-based knowledge: Rule-like knowledge is "knowledge in the network", but it is not "knowledge for the network". In other words, there is no sense in which a network that has acquired rule-like knowledge about some domain also has knowledge that it has this knowledge: The sorts of emergent representations learned by networks do not automatically afford corresponding meta-representations. Yet it is clear that such meta-representations are always present when humans apply a rule.
How then, can we distinguish between rule-like and rule-based behavior? Pothos notes, along with many others, that this has proven to be extremely difficult to achieve empirically, and some of these challenges in fact constitute his main motivation for defending the notion that the distinction between similarity-based and rule-based processing should be abandoned in favor of a wholly gradualist perspective. In the rest of this commentary, we would like to suggest that the difference between rule-like and rule-based knowledge is a crucial one, and offer ways in which the two can be distinguished from each other.
Our first point is that an important prediction of any rule-based account is that the rules should eventually, after sufficient training, apply equally well to familiar and novel stimuli. All definitions of the notion of "rule" take this feature as a defining one. That is, if I do indeed "have a rule" that I use to perform some classification task, then, by definition, and after sufficient training any decision I take based on the rule should apply equally well to items that I have had experience with than to items that are completely novel (e.g., items instantiated with novel features). Exploring this issue in the context of laboratory settings is challenging because it can always be argued that participants lacked sufficient time to induce the rule. Pacton et al. (2001) addressed this challenge by examining what happens over five years of exposure to orthographic regularities that can easily be described by a rule, such as the fact that no word in French may begin with a double consonant. Pacton et al. found that even after such extensive exposure to relevant material, participants still exhibited "transfer decrement", that is, depressed performance on novel forms as compared to familiar material. They concluded that the persistence of transfer decrement invalidates what they called the "abstractionist" position. Interestingly, the rules that Pacton et al. explored are never actually taught explicitly.
This brings us to our second point, namely the fact that it strikes us that a crucial difference between rule-like and rule-based performance is that when you have a rule, you also know explicitly that you have the rule. This point is made clear by a recent study concerning the effects of sleep on insight. Wagner et al. (2004) used a modified version of the Number Prediction Task, in which participants' goal is to determine the value of the final digit of a string of digits. To do so, participants sequentially apply one of two simple transformation rules to each pair of digits of the initial string. Each application reduces the length of the string by one digit. Unknown to participants, a hidden abstract rule can be used to determine the value of the last digit based on the identity of the second digit of the initial string. Once this regularity has been identified, the task therefore becomes trivial. All participants tend to respond faster with increasing practice on the task, but only those who gained insight of the abstract rule showed an abrupt and qualitative shift in responding. Wagner et al. further showed that sleep enhances insight, but only for those participants (the 'solvers'), who had exhibited antecedent of insight. According to Wagner et al., sleep exerts different effect on 'solvers' and 'non-solvers' because they developed different and overlapping representations of the material. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that these different kinds of representations are subtended by different cerebral regions: Insight might involve activity in the hippocampus and related medial temporal structures, which, in relation with prefrontal areas, are associated with conscious processing.
Rule-based knowledge might thus be based on different representations than those based on similarity, and even recruit different brain areas. Similarity-based -and possibly implicit -representations may be "rule-like", but genuine, symbolic rule knowledge is necessarily conscious and is accompanied by a qualitative shift in behavior. This argument is in line with previous suggestions by Shanks et al. (1997) , who also view genuine rule knowledge as necessarily conscious.
Availability to consciousness therefore appears to us as one important criterion that one can use to distinguish "rule-based" behavior from "rule-like" behavior. Note that this is another manner in which one can dispute Marcus et al. (1999) 's claim that 7-month-old infants possess rule-based knowledge. Indeed, were we to believe Marcus's claim, we would also have to admit one of two equally unsatisfactory possibilities: Either that unconscious rule manipulation and application is possible (therefore endorsing the strong computationalist metaphor that Searle, 1992 , and others have convincingly rejected), or that 7-month-old infants can engage in conscious reasoning in the same manner that adults can. In the face of this quandary, it appears much more plausible to simply reject the notion that symbolic, propositional rules can be represented and used unconsciously, and to accept, in line with Pothos's proposal, that rulelike behavior can occur (and be indistinguishable from rule-based behavior) on the basis of a learned sensitivity to functional (abstract) similarity.
Yet, by our account, we do have rules nevertheless -but then, these rules must be available to consciousness when applied. We conclude that conscious awareness, as revealed by the availability of relevant verbalizable metarepresentations, is the single feature that genuinely distinguishes between similarity-based (and possibly rule-like) knowledge on the one hand, and rulebased knowledge on the other. Understanding how and when the shift between these two forms of knowledge occurs is clearly an important challenge for the sub-symbolic perspective on cognition.
